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ERISA FOR DUMMIES: DOES METLIFE SIMPLIFY
AND CLARIFY?
Rosanne Marie Cross*
INTRODUCTION
After reviewing the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), one might dream of a Dummies reference' with clear
guidelines to simplify application of this befuddling set of rules.
Despite nearly twenty years of requests for simplification and
clarification, 2  Justice Scalia described the recent Court case
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn as "painfully opaque,
despite its promise of elucidation," failing to simplify or clarify
ERISA denial of benefits appeals involving an insurer caught in a
conflict of interest.
3
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn was not the Supreme
Court's first encounter with an insurer's conflict of interest created by
ERISA. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the Court
recognized the possibility of a conflict of interest created by an
insurer acting as both the administrator and the payer of a benefit
plan.4 According to Firestone, circuit courts should apply a
* Rosanne Marie Cross graduated from the Georgia State University College of Law in May 2010
where she was a Student Writing and Symposium Associate Editor. Ms. Cross completed her
undergraduate degree in the Classics at Emory University.
1. One can find a Dummies resource for almost any topic. Dummies.com, Making Everything
Easier, http://dummies.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
2. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn (Metlife), 128 S. Ct. 2343
(2008) (No. 06-923), 2007 WL 858651 (stating that the conflict amongst the circuits is "wide, deep and
mature"). See generally Court Stays the Course on ERIS.4, HEALTH CARE COLLECTOR, Sept. 2008, at 6,
adapted from Foley & Lardner LLP, Supreme Court Stays the ERISA Course in MetLife v. Glenn,
LEGAL NEWS ALERT, July 15, 2008, http://www.foley.com/abc.aspx?Publication=5169 [hereinafter
Court Stays ERISA Course] (emphasizing the "long-awaited opinion in Metropolitan Life Ins. v.
Glenn").
3. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2358 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). A fiduciary's conflict of
interest "is a common feature of ERISA plans." Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2353 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment). The Metlife "majority acknowledges that the 'lion's share of ERISA
plan claims denials' are made by administrators that both evaluate and pay claims." Id. (quoting
majority opinion).
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deferential standard of review instead of de novo review when a
"benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary
authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms
of the plan."5 However, Firestone failed to specify a standard of
review for cases involving a fiduciary conflict of interest by stating
only that "[the] conflict must be weighed as a 'facto[r] in determining
whether there is an abuse of discretion."' 6 Unsurprisingly, the federal
circuit courts have struggled to adjust 7 the seemingly straightforward
deferential standard of review to denial of benefits claims involving a
conflict of interest and a grant of discretionary authority.8 Since the
1989 Firestone decision,9 the circuit courts have established three
adjustments1" to the deferential standard of review dictated by
Firestone in cases involving a fiduciary's possible or actual"1 conflict
of interest and a grant of discretionary authority.'
2
5. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. After Firestone, nearly every ERISA plan was amended to "grant full
discretion to determine eligibility and/or to interpret plan provisions." Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial
Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 1083, 1131 (2001). Assuming
such language was present in the plan, the reviewing court should affirm the administrator's decision
unless the decision was "arbitrary, capricious, or made in bad faith," a highly deferential standard of
review. Id. The confusion surrounding Firestone and Metlife arises from a plan that grants discretionary
authority and also involves an administrator conflict of interest, thus placing the plan under a highly
deferential standard of review. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. 2343. Uncomfortable with granting
deference to an administrator who is operating under a conflict of interest, the courts have adjusted the
deferential standard. See discussion infra Part 1.
6. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959)).
7. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1146 ("As a result of Justice O'Connor's admonishment in Firestone
to consider conflict of interest as a factor in the application of a more deferential trust law type of
standard of review, all the circuits have attempted to adjust or modify ERISA's deferential standard of
review in conflict of interest contexts.").
8. See generally Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Judicial Review of Denial of Disability Benefits
Under Employee Benefit Plan Governed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29
U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1)(B)-Fiduciary Conflict of Interest-Post-Firestone Cases, 18 A.L.R. FED. 2D 607
(2006) [hereinafter Fiduciary Conflict of Interest-Post-Firestone Cases] (elaborating on the circuits'
standards of review and decisions applying the consideration of a fiduciary's conflict of interest).
9. Id.
10. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1153-62 (noting three adjustments to the standard of review).
11. Although the Court established that conflict of interest is a factor in determining whether there
was an abuse of discretion, the Court failed to specify if it was necessary that the conflict was actual or
if it was sufficient that the conflict was possible. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. The Court also declined to
explain how the circuits must determine the existence of a conflict of interest. Id.
12. The confusion about the number of adjustments made to the Firestone standard by the circuits
differs even for those compiling in secondary sources the options that circuits may take when faced with
a conflict of interest. See generally Kevin Walker Beatty, Commentary, A Decade of Confusion: The
Standard of Review for ERISA Benefit Denial Claims as Established by Firestone, 51 ALA. L. REv. 733,
744-47 (2000) (noting only two adjustments to the standard of review, the "sliding scale" and the
[Vol. 26:41336
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Resolution of the circuit split has long been desired. 13 This Note
ultimately concludes that Metlife, at its best, did not provide
resolution to the circuit split and, at its worst, aggravated the already
apparent division amongst the circuit courts. 14 Part I discusses the
three interpretations of the Firestone standard adopted by the circuit
courts. " Also addressed will be what Metlife says and, more
importantly, does not say by declining to deliver a "detailed set of
instructions ' 6 in an effort to clarify the confusion. 17 Part II then
analyzes whether the Court's holding in Metlife invalidates any of
those adjustments.1 8  Finally, Part III concludes with the
recommendation that the circuit courts go beyond the application of
the Metlife decision by relying on the principles of trust law, even to
the extent that they are not specifically incorporated into the Metlife
holding, in an effort to save time, preserve judicial resources, and
establish clarification for ERISA claimants and administrators. 19
I. BACKGROUND
A. ERISA: Finding Protection for the Employee Under Federal Law
With ERISA,2 ° Congress intended to protect beneficiaries of
employer-provided insurance policies by implementing standards of
"presumptively void" tests); Fiduciary Conflict of Interest-Post-Firestone Cases, supra note 8, at 607
(2006) (dividing the adjustment of the Firestone standard in conflict of interest cases into six
categories). This Note addresses the three general adjustments to the Firestone standard noted in
Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1153-62.
13. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn (Metlife), 128
S. Ct. 2343 (2008) (No. 06-923), 2007 WL 4613628 (stating that the question of how a conflict of
interest affects judicial review of ERISA denial of benefits claims is one that has "bedeviled the federal
courts" and has "salience in every circuit"). One commentator predicted eight years before Metlife that
the confusion would lead to substantial change. Beatty, supra note 12, at 750-51 (predicting that the
Firestone standard "is likely to be amended in some fashion, if not totally reworked altogether" because
of the "confusion among the circuit courts" and "the perception that the standard chills uniformity of
jurisprudence, one of ERISA's primary goals").
14. See discussion infra Part III.
15. See discussion infra Part I.A.
16. Metife, 128 S. Ct. at 2352.
17. See discussion infra Part I.
18. See discussion infra Part II.
19. See discussion infra Part IlI.
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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disclosure, reporting, and conduct for fiduciaries, 2 1 and by creating
predictable standards to encourage employers to provide benefit plans
to their employees.22 ERISA allows a "person denied benefits under
an employee benefit plan to challenge that denial in federal court."
23
Despite congressional plans to protect the employee under federal
law,24 the text of ERISA did not account for the creation of a conflict
of interest when an insurance company exercises the dual role of
determining the employee's eligibility for benefits and paying the
employee's benefits. 25  Because of this omission, Congress
unintentionally created a loophole through which an insurer could
deny benefits and avoid payment, whether or not the employee was
eligible for benefits.
In Firestone, the Court established that "generally... courts are to
review denials of benefits under a de novo standard of review, unless
the plan grants discretionary authority to the plan administrator to
make decisions concerning eligibility and benefits," in which case a
deferential standard of review should be employed.26 The Firestone
Court stated that a fiduciary's conflict of interest "must be weighed
as a 'facto[r] in determining whether there is an abuse of
discretion.' 27 Following Firestone, the circuit courts developed three
different approaches in applying the deferential standard of review to
cases where a plan grants discretionary authority to account for a
21. Id. § 1001(b).
22. Id. § 1001(a).
23. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn (Metlife), 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2346 (2008) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ I 132(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V 2005)).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).
25. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Judicial Review of Denial of Disability Benefits Under Employee
Benefit Plan Governed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B)-Selection and Scope of Particular Standards of Review-Post-Firestone Cases, 12
A.L.R. FED. 2D 1, § 2 (2006) [hereinafter Selection and Scope of Particular Standards of Review]
("Although a cause of action for the recovery of disability benefits under employee welfare benefit plans
is provided for in 29 U.S.C.A § I 132(a)(1)(B), ERISA is silent as to any of the elements of judicial
review of the denial of such benefits.").
26. Id. at introductory cmt. (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)).
27. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959)).
Although the circuits have treated the conflict of interest factor as part of Firestone's holding, Justice
Scalia notes in his Metlife dissent that the statement was merely dictum, which the Metlife majority has
taken and "buil[t] a castle upon." Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2357 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 26:41338
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fiduciary's conflict of interest: the de novo review adjustment, the
sliding scale adjustment, and the presumptively void adjustment.28
1. De Novo Review Adjustment
The Second Circuit, unlike every other circuit, applies a two-step
test instead of the deferential Firestone standard once a claimant
alleges a conflict of interest. 29  First, the claimant must provide
"evidence that a potential conflict of interest exists," 30 and second,
the claimant must prove that the conflict of interest actually affected
the fiduciary's decision.3 1  Once "the court determines the
administrator's decision was affected by the conflict of interest,"
32
the court exercises de novo review.33 Under this approach, the
reviewing court "essentially stands in the shoes of the ERISA
fiduciary/administrator" by substituting its judgment for that of the
administrator; accordingly, the court must "construe the plan
primarily based upon the plan language.",34 Although the Second
Circuit questioned this approach in 1998 as possibly inconsistent with
Firestone,35 the circuit continued to apply this approach until the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Metlife.36
28. For an extended explanation of the three adjustments to the ERISA deferential standard of
review and the case law which developed each standard, a topic which is beyond the scope of this note,
see Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1153-62. For an explanation of factors affecting the selection of a
standard of review, see Selection and Scope of Particular Standards of Review, supra note 25.
29. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1153-54 (citing Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Def. Co., 82 F.3d 1251,
1255-56 (2d Cir. 1996)) (explaining the development of the two-step test through the Second Circuit
case law).
30. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 10.
31. Id.
32. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1154.
33. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 10.
34. Selection and Scope of Particular Standards of Review, supra note 25, § 23.
35. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1154 (citing DeFelice v. Am. Int'l Life Assurance Co., 112 F.3d 61,
66 (2d Cir. 1997)).
36. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 10. Following the Metlife
decision, the Second Circuit has acknowledged that the two-step test included in Sullivan v. LTV
Aerospace & Defense Co. "is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's instructions in Glenn and [has]
abandon[ed] it." McCauley v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co., 551 F.3d 126, 128 (2d Cir. 2008).
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2. The Sliding Scale Adjustment
The majority of the circuit courts that have weighed in on this issue
apply an abuse-of-discretion sliding scale standard. That is, once a
claimant has produced evidence of an actual or potential conflict, the
standard "allows the courts to lessen and to adjust the deference
afforded to the plan administrator's decision." 37 Although the First,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits do not "view an administrator's dual
roles alone as a conflict of interest, in circumstances where they do
identify a conflict of interest," they essentially apply a sliding scale
standard by increasing the "degree of scrutiny of a benefit denial. 38
In the interest of fairness, those circuit courts review the
administrator's decision on a standard of reasonableness 39 and adjust
the level of deference given to the conflicted fiduciary's decision in
proportion to the severity of the conflict. Because it weighs the
conflict of interest with other factors surrounding the denial of
benefits, the sliding scale standard most closely mirrors the directions
given in Firestone.
4 1
3. The Presumptively Void Adjustment
In contrast, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits apply a presumptively
void standard, also known as "burden shifting,' 42 when reviewing
benefit claim denials where a conflict of interest is alleged. Once a
conflict has been alleged or presumed, the presumptively void
adjustment shifts the burden to the administrator to prove that "its
37. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1155.
38. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 9.
39. Id.
40. Beatty, supra note 12, at 744-45 ("The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits have adopted
the 'sliding scale' approach, under which the reviewing court always applies the abuse of discretion
standard but decreases the amount of discretion given to a conflicted administrator's decision in
proportion to the gravity of the conflict.").
41. Id. at 746 n.92 (citing Armstrong v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 F.3d 1263, 1267 (8th Cir. 1997))
("It is difficult, if not impossible, to read this language from Firestone Tire contrary to the 'sliding scale'
approach.").
42. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 10. There has long been
confusion about what test or standard each circuit applies. According to certain authors, the Tenth
Circuit applies the sliding scale approach. See supra note 40.
[Vol. 26:41340
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interpretation [of the plan] ... was not tainted by self-interest. 'A3 The
Tenth Circuit presumes that the conflicted fiduciary's decision is void
unless the "administrator [has] demonstrate[d] that its interpretation
of the terms of the plan is reasonable and that its application of those
terms to the claimant is supported by substantial evidence.
'
"
4
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit first determines, de novo, if the
administrator's decision was "wrong," then "the burden shifts to the
fiduciary to prove that its interpretation of plan provisions committed
to its discretion was not tainted by self-interest. ' '45 Arguably, the
presumptively void standard directly conflicts with the Firestone
holding; 46 nevertheless, the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
continued to apply the presumptively void standard until Metlife.47
B. Metlife v. Glenn: What It Says and What It Doesn't Say
The Court first determined in Metlife that the dual functions of an
entity-administration of a benefit plan (determining the employee's
eligibility for benefits) and payment of those benefits-create a
conflict of interest.48 According to the majority, circuit courts should
consider this conflict as a factor in reviewing the denial of benefits
and should weigh this factor according to the circumstances of the
particular case.49 Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, addressed
the circuit split by stating that Firestone's explanation "that a conflict
should 'be weighed as a factor in determining whether there is an
abuse of discretion"' 50 does not imply "a change in the standard of
43. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1159 (citing Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898
F.2d 1556, 1566 (11 th Cir. 1990)).
44. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 10 (quoting Fought v. Unum Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1006 (10th Cir. 2004)).
45. Id. (quoting Brown, 898 F.2d at 1566).
46. Beatty, supra note 12, at 746 (citing Armstrong v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 F.3d 1263, 1267 (8th
Cir. 1997) (noting that adoption of the de novo standard for plans that give discretion to the
administrator is directly contrary to Court precedent established in Firestone)).
47. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 10; Kennedy, supra note 5, at
1160.
48. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn (Metlife), 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2346 (2008) (citing Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2350 (quoting Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115).
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review, say, from deferential to de novo review." 51 However, the
majority also failed to give any boundaries to the consideration of the
conflict of interest, 52 declining to give the circuit courts "a detailed
set of instructions.,
53
Despite requests for clarification on the circuit split,54 the majority
did not limit the consideration of a conflict of interest in the Firestone
test to conflicts that actually affected the benefit denial. 55 This
allowed the circuits to continue weighing actual and inherent
conflicts in denial of benefit reviews. 56 The majority also failed to
clarify how the reviewing court should treat the existence of a
conflict, inviting continued "substitution of judicial discretion for the
discretion of the plan administrator." 57 Justice Scalia in his dissent
rejected the majority's "totality-of-the-circumstances (so-called)
'test,' in which the existence of a conflict is to be put into the mix and
given some (unspecified) 'weight,"' because it ultimately "makes
each case unique, and hence the outcome of each case
unpredictable. '"
58
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2355 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("The majority's
application of its approach [to the consideration of a conflict as a factor in benefit denial review]
confirms its overbroad reach and indeterminate nature.").
53. Id. at 2352.
54. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 12 (explaining that Metlife is a
"suitable vehicle to address both" the question of "whether a dual-role administrator has a conflict of
interest, [and] also how a conflict of interest is to be weighed on judicial review of a benefit denial under
a plan that grants the administrator discretionary authority to interpret plan terms or decide benefit
claims").
55. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2353 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
("Judicial review under the majority's opinion is less constrained, because courts can look to the bare
presence of a conflict as authorizing more exacting scrutiny.").
56. Id. (describing the majority opinion as "so imprecise about how the existence of a conflict should
be treated in a reviewing court's analysis"); see also id. at 2357 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that
according to the law of trusts, which control ERISA denial of benefits claims, "a fiduciary with a
conflict does not abuse its discretion unless the conflict actually and improperly motivates the decision,"
which the majority does not address and of which there is "no evidence").
57. Id. at 2353 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
58. Id. at 2357 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2354 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (describing the majority test as a "kitchen-sink approach").
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C. More Questions Than Answers: Life After Metlife
In Metlife, the Court left "the law more uncertain, more
unpredictable than it found it,"'59 thus evading the important criteria
of "certainty and predictability" 60  under ERISA and leaving
employers to ponder what it means that the conflict of interest will be
"one of the 'impalpable factors involved in judicial review' of
benefits decisions." 61 The circuit courts will likely wrestle with this
"kitchen-sink," totality-of-the-circumstances factor test established in
Metlife for years to come.62  According to Justice Scalia, the
uncertainty and unpredictability of the Metlife majority test leaves the
administrator of the benefit plan, "[who] has been explicitly given
discretion by the creator of the plan," in an unreasonable position.
63
Not only does the Metlife decision leave the administrator in a
precarious position, the decision also leaves the beneficiary in a
similar position of uncertainty. 64 Ultimately, the Metlife decision
leaves the circuit courts with more questions than answers by
establishing conflict of interest as a factor for consideration, but
failing to rectify the split amongst the circuit courts. 65 One discovers
the possible pitfalls the circuit courts may encounter when applying
Metlife66  by exploring the validity of the adjustments to the
deferential Firestone standard of review, without expanding into the
factors that lead a circuit to a particular standard of review67 or the
history of how the circuit courts have established such adjustments.68
59. Id. at 2354 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
60. Id.
61. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2354 (citing Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379
(2002) (noting "ERISA's policy of inducing employers to offer benefits by assuring a predictable set of
liabilities, under uniform standards of primary conduct")).
62. Court Stays ERISA Course, supra note 2, at 7.
63. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2357 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. See Court Stays ERISA Course, supra note 2, at 7 (explaining that beneficiaries hoped for a de
novo standard of review before Metlife, an option made invalid by the opinion); see also Beatty, supra
note 12, at 751 (noting that Firestone presents a standard, "which essentially allows plan administrators
to police themselves simply by supplying the proper language, is inherently unfair to plan participants"
and that a "standard that allows plan administrators to control the level of deference to be afforded their
decisions does not appear to comply with the intent of the statute").
65. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. 2343.
66. See discussion infra Part 11I.
67. See generally Fiduciary Conflict ofInterest-Post-Firestone Cases, supra note 8.
68. See generally Kennedy, supra note 5.
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II. ANALYSIS
As unpredictable and uncertain 69 as Metlife may seem, circuit
courts will eventually be forced to decipher the majority's test.70
Exploring the decision's effect on the current adjustments to the
Firestone standard taken by the circuit courts71 is a logical starting
point. The adjustments taken to the Firestone standard have
developed for nearly twenty years;72  the alterations of the
adjustments following Metlife are certain to prove just as time
consuming.
73
A. Metlife and the De Novo Review Adjustment
Metlife may have invalidated the Second Circuit's two-step process
in which the claimant establishes that a potential conflict of interest
exists and then proves that the conflict of interest actually affected
the decision. 74 Although Metlife establishes that a fiduciary acting as
both the administrator and the payer of the plan is acting in a conflict
of interest, 75 the decision does not specify whether the conflict must
have actually affected the decision or only possibly affected the
decision.76 Assuming, arguendo, that the plan provides "the
administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine
eligibility for benefits," 77  the Second Circuit only adjusts the
69. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2354 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
("Certainty and predictability are important criteria under ERISA, and employers considering whether to
establish ERISA plans can have no notion of what it means to say that a standard feature of such plans
will be one of the 'impalpable factors involved in judicial review' of benefits decisions.").
70. Id. at 2353.
71. See discussion supra Part Ii (explaining the adjustments to the Firestone standard made by
circuit courts prior to Metlife).
72. Firestone was argued in front of the Court on November 30, 1988 and decided on February 21,
1989, nearly twenty years prior to the writing of this Note. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101 (1989).
73. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2352-56 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
74. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 10 (citing Pulvers v. First UNUM
Life Ins. Co., 210 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2000)); see discussion supra Part I.A. 1.
75. Metife, 128 S. Ct. at 2346 (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115).
76. Id at 2353-54 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (explaining that the
majority does not specify if the conflict of interest must be actual or only possible).
77. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
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deferential standard if the claimant is not successful in proving that
the conflict actually affected the decision.78 Even though Firestone
specified that conflict of interest is one factor within the judicial
standard of review to determine an abuse of discretion, 79 neither
Firestone nor Metlife establish conflict of interest as an issue of proof
resting on the claimant.
80
In Pulvers v. First UNUM Life Insurance Co., the Second Circuit
directly rejected the claimant's argument that de novo review was
appropriate because the administrator was acting in an "'inherent
conflict of interest' based on its dual status as plan administrator and
plan insurer. ' 's  Instead of accepting the inherent conflict, the Second
Circuit required the claimant to prove that the conflict in fact
influenced the decision, a contention that was unsupported by any
evidence.82 If the claimant fails to satisfy the burden of proof
regarding the actual influence of the conflict of interest, then "any
conflict [that] the administrator has is simply one more factor in
determining whether the challenged decision was arbitrary and
capricious. ' 83  Because Metlife establishes that acting as both
administrator and payer is an inherent conflict of interest, 84 the
Pulvers claimant's argument would now likely have to be accepted
by the court-the administrator was operating with an inherent
conflict of interest. 85 However, because Metlife does not limit the
application of conflict of interest as a factor in determining an abuse
of discretion to when the conflict "actually and improperly motivates
78. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1154. The deferential, arbitrary, and capricious standard of review is
triggered by the inclusion of a grant of discretionary authority to the plan administrator. Firestone, 489
U.S. at 115. Because the conflict of interest at issue in Metlife is commonplace and extant in a "lion's
share of ERISA plan claims denials" the majority declined to "overturn Firestone by adopting a rule that
in practice would bring about near universal review by judges de novo ..." Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2350.
It remains to be seen if Metlife, in an effort to avoid substitution of judicial discretion for that of the
ERISA administrator, has created "nothing but de novo review in sheep's clothing." Id. at 2358 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
79. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
80. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. 2343; Firestone, 489 U.S. 101; Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1154.
81. Pulvers v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co., 210 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2000).
82. Id. (citing Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Def. Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1256 (2d Cir. 1996)).
83. Owen v. Wade Lupe Constr. Co., 325 F. Supp. 2d 146, 152 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Pulvers, 210
F.3d at 92).
84. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2346 (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115).
85. See Pulvers, 210 F.3d at 92.
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the decision," 86  the Court instructed the circuit courts to follow
principles of trust law as specified in the Restatement. 87 The Second
Circuit approach, like the principles of trust law, requires actual
improper influence by the conflict of interest to trigger de novo
review.88 By requiring that the administrator was in fact influenced
by the conflict of interest, the Second Circuit falls closer to the
standards of trust law than the Metlife majority. 89
B. Metlife and the Sliding Scale Adjustment
By establishing a multi-factor test with each factor weighed
accordingly on a case-by-case basis, 90 Metlife affirmed the majority
of the circuit courts who have established a sliding scale adjustment
for when a conflict of interest is inferred or proven.91 By establishing
that judges ought to "take account of several different considerations
of which a conflict of interest is one," 92 and suggesting that even
though the conflict of interest in Metlife was of "great importance, 93
the Court condoned adjustment of the deferential standard of review
86. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2357 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 2357 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (specifying that Firestone ought to direct the Court to the
answer in this case because it held that "federal courts hearing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) claims should
review the decisions of ERISA-plan administrators the same way that courts have traditionally reviewed
decisions of trustees" and stating that the Court bases its decision on dictum and the "Justices' fondness
for a judge-liberating totality-of-the-circumstances 'test').
88. Owen, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 152 (citing Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 106 F.3d
475, 477 (2d Cir. 1997)) ("An exception to applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review in
this situation can be invoked, however, when it is demonstrated that the administrator had an actual
conflict of interest, and that such conflict in fact 'affected the reasonableness of the administrator's
decision."').
89. See Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2352-53 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(stating that the conflict of interest should be considered "on review only when there is evidence that the
benefits denial was motivated or affected by the administrator's conflict" even though the majority
"would accord weight, of varying and indeterminate amount, to the existence of such a conflict in every
case where it is present").
90. Id. at 2351 (majority opinion).
91. Id. (explaining that there was nothing improper about the "Court of Appeals' opinion [that]
illustrates the combination-of-factors method of review"); see Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1155 ("Once a
conflict of interest is inferred for the majority of [the] circuits or proven for the minority, most courts
agree the arbitrary and capricious standard should be reformulated and adjusted as a sliding scale
standard of review.").
92. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2351 (expanding on what the term "factor," as used in Firestone, implies).
93. Id. (listing other circumstances that "suggest a higher likelihood that [the conflict] affected the
benefits decision").
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depending on the seriousness of the conflict.94 The Court stayed the
course on ERISA claims by maintaining the Firestone multiple factor
test95 and acknowledging "[b]enefits decisions arise in too many
contexts, concern too many circumstances, and can relate in too many
different ways" to culminate in the creation of a "one-size-fits-all
procedural system that is likely to produce fair and accurate
review." 96 The majority, although acknowledging the existence of
several factors, failed to provide guidance to the circuit courts as to
the "modus operandi of 'weighing' all of these factors together.
'
"
97
By neglecting to mention any process for applying the totality-of-the-
circumstances test, the Court left the majority of the circuit courts
applying the sliding scale adjustment to manipulate the test as they
see fit on a case-by-case basis.
98
Before Metlife, the First and Seventh Circuits did not view the dual
role of an ERISA administrator alone as a conflict of interest "that
must be taken into account on review of a discretionary benefit
determination." 99 Although those two circuits recognized the
potential of a conflict of interest, they reasoned that "there is no need
to adjust the level of scrutiny because market forces will counter-
balance that potential."'100 The clash of the First and Seventh Circuits'
approach with the Metlife holding establishing a dual role as a
conflict of interest is as close to direct guidance from the Court as the
decision comes. 10 1 The First and Seventh Circuits must now
94. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 9.
95. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2351.
96. Id. ("Special procedural rules would create further complexity, adding time and expense to a
process that may already be too costly for many of those who seek redress."). Despite an effort to
maintain simplicity and keep costs down, the multiple factor test "makes each case unique, and hence
the outcome of each case unpredictable." Id. at 2357 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "[B]ecause the standard is
one for the courts to determine and adjust, litigation will necessarily increase as plaintiffs have been
afforded a second chance to challenge the bias in a plan administrator's decision." Kennedy, supra note
5, at 1156. Consequently, the Metlife holding may act to increase costs through added litigation because
the "ERISA's arbitrary and capricious standard is simply 'a range, not a point."' Id. (citing Van Boxel v.
Journal Co. Employee's Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1988)).
97. Metife, 128 S. Ct. at 2357 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (describing the majority test as "judge-liberating").
99. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 8.
100. Id.
101. See Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2348.
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acknowledge that the dual role alone is sufficient to establish a
conflict of interest. 1
02
The Eighth Circuit, though acknowledging that it applies the
sliding scale adjustment, requires that claimants satisfy a test that it
calls the "two-part gateway requirement."' 0 3 Under the first part of
this test the claimant must establish, in excess of the mere existence
of a conflict of interest, the existence of a bias through "material,
probative evidence."'' 4 To satisfy the second requirement the
claimant must prove a connection between the conflict and the denial
of benefits decision. 10 5 A "considerable hurdle for plaintiffs,"' 0 6 the
evidence "must demonstrate that the plan administrator's decision
was arbitrary or a product of whim."'1 7 Even though Metlife
acknowledges that conflict of interest must be weighed in proportion
to the severity of the conflict, 10 8 thereby validating the sliding scale
concept, the decision does not specify that the claimant must prove
the existence of bias in excess of establishing a conflict of interest.'
0 9
Nor does Metlife require that the claimant prove a connection
between the conflict and the denial of benefits. 110 If the Court had
strictly applied the law of trusts to the conflict of interest conundrum,
then the majority would have specified that the claimant must
produce evidence that the conflict "actually and improperly
motivate[d]" the decision.'11 However, because the majority failed to
specify any evidentiary requirements 112 and required the application
102. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. 2343. Justice Scalia comments in his dissent that the majority's
reliance on Firestone's statement that a conflict of interest as a factor in determining an abuse of
discretion is faulty because that statement in Firestone was merely dictum. Id. at 2357 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). According to Justice Scalia, the "dictum cannot bear [the] weight" placed on it by the
majority opinion. Id.
103. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1157 (citing Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir.
1998)).
104. Id.
105. Id.at1157-58.
106. Id at 1158 (internal quotations omitted).
107. Id. (citing Buttram v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 76 F.3d 896, 900
(8th Cir. 1996)).
108. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn (Metlife), 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2008).
109. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. 2343.
110. See generally id.
11l. Id. at 2357 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
112. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. 2343.
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of the law of trusts to the situation, the Eighth Circuit approach may
still be valid under Metlife.l"3
C. Metlife and the Presumptively Void Adjustment
Because they presume that the conflicted administrator's decision
is void, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits may be forced to change
their adjustment of the Firestone deferential standard following
Metlife.114 Although the Court solidified the Firestone holding by
establishing a conflict of interest as a factor in determination of an
abuse of discretion, 115 it did not establish the conflict of interest
factor as determinative of invalidity. 116  In circuits applying the
presumptively void adjustment, the claimant must prove either a
substantial conflict or an inherent conflict; otherwise the conflict of
interest is not appropriate for consideration.1 7 Once the conflict is
established, "the Tenth Circuit shifts the burden of proof to the plan
administrator to establish 'the reasonableness of its decision pursuant
to [the] court's traditional arbitrary and capricious standard.""'1 8 If
the plan administrator fails to satisfy the burden, the decision is
presumed void." l9 By placing the burden of proof on the plan
administrator, the Tenth Circuit adjustment to the Firestone standard
runs contrary to the main goal of reviewing courts, which is to
113. Id. at 2350 ("Trust law continues to apply a deferential standard of review to the discretionary
decisionmaking [sic] of a conflicted trustee, while at the same time requiring the reviewing judge to take
account of the conflict when determining whether the trustee, substantively or procedurally, has abused
his discretion.").
114. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 10 (noting that the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Metlife was in direct conflict "with decisions of the Second, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits,
thereby exacerbating an existing circuit split").
115. See infra note 148.
116. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2346.
117. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1159.
118. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 10 (citing Fought v. UNUM Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1006 (10th Cir. 2004)); see also Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2359-60 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (describing the difficulty with a reasonableness standard and stating that "[clommon sense
confirms that a trustee's conflict of interest is irrelevant to determining the substantive reasonableness of
his decision").
119. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1160. The plan "administrator must demonstrate that its interpretation
of the terms of the plan is reasonable and that its application of those terms to the claimant is supported
by substantial evidence." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 10 (citing
Fought, 379 F.3d at 1006).
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"respect the discretionary authority conferred on ERISA fiduciaries
[in order to] encourage[] employers to provide medical and
retirement benefits to their employees through ERISA-govemed
plans-something they are not required to do."'120 However, Metlife
declined to address the procedural issue of burden-shifting raised by
the Tenth Circuit's burden-shifting adjustment to the standard of
review. 12 1  Even though Metlife classified the dual role of an
administrator as a conflict of interest, 122 the circuit courts, like the
Tenth Circuit, that employ burden-shifting may still require that the
claimant prove the conflict after Metlife123 because the decision failed
to specify whether the conflict must have affected the benefit denial
to be weighed in the court's Firestone standard. Only time will tell if
the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, like the Second Circuit, 124 will
continue placing the burden of establishing a conflict of interest on
the claimant. 1
25
The Eleventh Circuit, in an effort to apply trust law to ERISA
denial of benefit review-as required by Firestone126 and reinforced
by Metlife, 127-reasoned that "under trust law ... any self-interested
action taken by a trustee could trigger a violation of fiduciary
obligations, which rendered such action presumptively void."'128 After
a conflict of interest has been established, the court determines if the
120. Medtife, 128 S. Ct. at 2353 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
121. Id. at 2351 (majority opinion).
122. Id. at 2348.
123. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. 2343. Even though the circuits may be able to apply the Metlife
decision to situations involving an administrator's conflict of interest that is merely inherent and not
actual, application of trust law would lead the courts to consider only actual abuses of discretion
resulting from a conflict of interest in benefit denial review. Id. at 2354 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment) ("It is the actual motivation that matters in reviewing benefits decisions for
an abuse of discretion, not the bare presence of the conflict itself.").
124. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1154.
125. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. 2343.
126. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
127. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2351.
128. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1161 (citing Lang v. Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Applied
Remote Tech., Inc., 125 F.3d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 1997)). Even though the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
attempt to apply the principles of trust law to ERISA denial of benefit cases "religiously," this has been
an uphill battle because "ER1SA ... does not follow all the dictates of trust law." Id. After noting that
ERISA allows for a conflict of interest, Kennedy explains that "interjecting any conflict of interest as
merely a factor in the adjustment of the judicial standard of review" fails to afford the administrators
"advance knowledge of the standard that will be applied to their decisions." Id.
[Vol. 26:41350
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administrator's decision was "wrong" 29-that is, whether the
"fiduciaries or trustees failed to act in the sole interests of the
beneficiaries by acting to advance the interests of [themselves]."' 30
Metlife espoused a multi-factor test for purposes of fairness,1 31
requiring circuit courts to consider the conflict, but did not provide
any guidance as to the weight each factor should be given. 132 Despite
the majority's attempt to base their denial of "near universal review
by judges de novo"1 33 on congressional intent, 134 in practice the
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits' adjustment to the Firestone standard
creates a de novo standard of review.1 35  Though disguising the
burden-shifting, presumptively void approach as an adjustment of the
Firestone deferential standard of review, these circuits effectively
provide the claimant with a presumption that the decision was
arbitrary and capricious. 136  Additionally, the presumptively void
adjustment is in conflict with the "initial purpose of ERISA to
continue the growth and development of privately-sponsored
employee benefit plans"'137 because it allows the claimant to
successfully challenge a denial of benefits with proof of an actual or
inherent conflict. 138 Metlife condones a "combination-of-factors" test
to review a denial of benefits claim, 139 but it does not condone a
129. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 10.
130. Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1566 (1 th Cir. 1990).
131. Metife, 128 S. Ct. at 2351 (stating "a one-size-fits-all procedural system" is unlikely to "promote
fair and accurate review").
132. Id. at 2352 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("The majority would
accord weight, of varying and indeterminate amount, to the existence of such a conflict in every case
where [a conflict] is present.").
133. Id. at 2353 (internal quotations omitted) (reiterating the importance of deference to the "lion's
share of ERISA plan claims denials" (internal quotations omitted)).
134. Id. at 2351 (majority opinion) ("Had Congress intended such a system of review, we believe it
would not have left to the courts the development of review standards but would have said more on the
subject.").
135. Id. at 2359 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1160 ("[The] sliding standard of review weighs heavily on the
fiduciary to disprove that its benefit denial was not tainted by a conflict of interest.").
137. Id. at 1162.
138. Id. ("If all that is needed is proof of a potential or actual conflict of interest, there is little to lose
in challenging a benefits denial case.. .
139. Medife, 128 S. Ct. at2351.
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presumption of invalidity if the administrator fails to prove that it was
not influenced by a conflict of interest.14
0
Even though alterations of the adjustments taken by the circuits to
the Firestone test after Metlife will take time, something should be
done to rectify this confusion. 141 There were hopes that Metlife would
provide clarity to the division among the circuits; 142 although it failed
to do so directly, 143 the circuits may still glean insight from the recent
Supreme Court case. 144
III. PREDICTION
Only time will determine the overall impact of the Metlife
decision. 145 The circuit courts have a difficult task ahead of them 146 -
"[i]n the words of Judge Becker of the Third Circuit, 'only the
Supreme Court can undo the legacy of Firestone."'' 147 Although it has
done so in the past, the Court took no notice of the circuit split and
declined to address it in the Metlife decision entirely.148 Contrary to
Justice Becker's hope for clarification of the Firestone legacy, the
Metlife decision failed to put an end to the confusion among the
circuit courts. 14 9 After struggling to alter the Firestone test, 5 ° the
140. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. 2343.
141. See generally id. at 2352-56 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
142. Court Stays ERISA Course, supra note 2, at 6 (calling the Metlife opinion "long-awaited").
143. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. 2343.
144. See discussion infra Part HI.
145. Given the twenty year development of the current adjustments taken to the Firestone standard, it
will likely take some time for the circuits to accommodate the Metlife holding. See Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at
2355 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("The majority's application of its
approach confirms [the holding's] overbroad reach and indeterminate nature."). See generally Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
146. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2353 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
("Saying that courts should consider the mere existence of a conflict in every case, without focusing that
consideration in any way, invites the substitution of judicial discretion for the discretion of the plan
administrator.").
147. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1168 (citing Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377,
393 (3d Cir. 2000)) (arguing that Firestone is not easily reconciled with the basic principles of trust
law).
148. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. 2343. It is not unusual for the Court to directly address a circuit
split. See, e.g., Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) ("We granted certiorari to resolve the
[clircuit split and now reverse." (citation omitted)); Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S.
739, 743 (2004) ("We granted certiorari in order to resolve the resulting [c]ircuit split ... .
149. See Court Stays ERISA Course, supra note 2, at 6-7.
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imprecise, "kitchen-sink"'151  "combination-of-factors method of
review ' 52 established by Metlife may prove just as difficult to
decipher. 153 However, the circuit courts may find some clarification
by looking past the Metlife requirements and referencing instead the
source of law originally prescribed by Firestone-the principles of
trust law as outlined in the Restatement.
54
A. The Future of the De Novo Review Adjustment
The Second Circuit's two-step adjustment to de novo review, in
which the claimant establishes that a potential conflict of interest
exists and that the conflict actually affected the decision,' 55 faces two
challenges in light of Metlife. First, the adjustment places the burden
of proof on the claimant to show that the administrator is actually
acting in a conflict of interest; once established, the court shifts to de
novo review. 156 Metlife does not establish that the conflict must be
actual instead of inherent,157 and in applying the de novo review
adjustment the Second Circuit is likely to experience an increase in
litigation over its actual conflict requirement.' 58 No matter which
150. Beatty, supra note 12, at 744 (citing Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1322 (9th Cir.
1995)) ("Since Firestone, however, courts have not been able to provide much consistency regarding the
exact way a conflict of interest affects the standard of review.").
151. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2353-54 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(stating that the majority is "so imprecise about how the existence of a conflict should be treated in a
reviewing court's analysis" and that "[n]othing in Firestone compels the majority's kitchen-sink
approach").
152. Id. at 2351 (majority opinion). According to Justice Scalia, the reasonableness standard
promulgated by the majority is "nothing but de novo review in sheep's clothing." Id at 2358 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
153. Id. at 2358 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("How a court should go about conducting this review is
unclear.").
154. Justice Scalia outlines this approach that he believes reconciles itself with Firestone more readily
than the majority opinion. Id. at 2359. Justice Scalia states that he "would adopt the entirety of the
Restatement's clear guidelines for judicial review" as outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts
section 187. Id. One of the positives to this approach is that the Restatement defines "[a]buse of
discretion" as referring to "four distinct failures: the trustee acted dishonestly; he acted with some other
improper motive; he failed to use judgment; or he acted beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment."
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. e (1959)). This
definition alone would clarify some of the confusion among the circuits.
155. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 13, at 10.
156. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1153.
157. See Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2353 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
158. Court Stays ERISA Course, supra note 2, at 7.
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approach the Second Circuit takes, the Metlife majority sways the
existence of an ERISA administrator's conflict of interest in a
benefits denial claim in favor of the claimant, who desires the conflict
of interest be held against the insurer so that he can recover
previously denied benefits. 159 Second, the lack of specificity
regarding the requirement of an actual conflict of interest in Metlife is
sure to be challenged by claimants who want to use an inherent
conflict of interest to their advantage. 160 Even though Metlife does
not distinguish between an inherent and an actual conflict of interest,
the Second Circuit may find refuge in the application of trust law
principles, as established foundationally by Firestone,161 that require
an actual conflict of interest. By continuing to require an actual
conflict, the Second Circuit will be able to maintain the actual
conflict of interest standard.
B. The Future of the Sliding Scale Adjustment
In practice, the Metlife totality-of-the-circumstances test combines
the sliding scale test and the Firestone holding.162 However, despite
its validity under Metlife, the sliding scale adjustment creates
problems for the circuit courts attempting to apply the Metlife test.
First, Metlife did not specify how the circuit courts are to weigh the
factors, 163 nor did it give a comprehensive list of factors that should
be considered. 164 Contrary to Justice Scalia's assertion that he "would
adopt the entirety of the Restatement's clear guidelines for judicial
review,"'1 65  the majority declined to give a set of detailed
159. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. 2343.
160. See generally Court Stays ERISA Course, supra note 2.
161. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111-13 (1989).
162. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2351.
163. Id. at 2358 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 2351 (majority opinion) (stating that the Metlife test, like other legal standards, "ask[s]
judges to determine lawfulness by taking account of several different, often case-specific, factors,
reaching a result by weighing all together"). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, points out that
some of the factors given in the Restatement can be "alone determinative, without the necessity of
'weighing' other factors." Id. at 2358 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 187 (1959)).
165. Id. at 2359 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "Looking to the common law of trusts..., a court reviewing
a trustee's decision would substitute its own de novo judgment for a trustee's only if it found either that
the trustee had no discretion in making the decision,... or that the trustee had discretion but abused it.
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instructions 166 and, in doing so, created a "judge-liberating totality-
of-the-circumstances 'test."" 67 Even though the majority claimed to
follow the principles of trust law, 168 it failed to include the principles
within the Metlife holding, 169 thus leaving the circuit courts up to
their own devices to determine how to weigh the factors in each case.
Reviewing circuit courts have been granted more discretion under
Metlife than they were under Firestone. The circuit courts will teeter
on the balance between the application of the combination-of-factors
test and the tendency of such a test to become de novo review in
disguise, as warned of by the dissent. 170 The lack of predictability and
certainty with each ERISA denial of benefits claim is sure to prove
troublesome and time consuming.171
A second problem created by the collision between the sliding
scale standard and Metlife is that Metlife fails to answer whether the
conflict of interest must be actual instead of merely inherent.' 72 Even
though, as Justice Scalia points out in his dissent, the principles of
trust law require that the conflict of interest be actual, 173 not merely
possible or inherent, the majority fails to make a determination
between the two. The ability of the reviewing court to consider both
actual and inherent conflicts of interest in the Metlife multi-factor test
may lead the circuit courts away from general deference for the
administrator's decision. This would directly conflict with the goal of
the Metlife majority to promote deference to the "lion's share of
Otherwise, the court would defer to the trustee." Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at
111-12; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959)).
166. Id. at 2353 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("In a triumph of
understatement, the Court acknowledges that its approach 'does not consist of a detailed set of
instructions."').
167. Id. at 2358 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2347 (majority opinion) ("In 'determining the appropriate standard of
review' a court should be 'guided by principles of trust law."' (quoting Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111)).
169. Id at 2358 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court's 'elucidation' of the [Firestone dictum] does
not reveal trust-law practice as much as it reveals the Justices' fondness for a judge-liberating totality-
of-the-circumstances 'test."').
170. Id.
171. See generally Court Stays ERISA Course, supra note 2.
172. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. 2343.
173. Id. at 2357 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ERISA plan claims denials."'174 Unless the circuit courts go out of
their way to apply trust law principles, it is likely that the circuit
courts applying the sliding scale standard will continue to consider
both an actual and an inherent conflict as a factor in determining an
abuse of discretion. 175 The circuit courts would be wise, however, to
look past the requirements stated by Metlife and go directly to the
source of law originally prescribed by Firestone by relying on the
principles of trust law as outlined in the Restatement. 176
The third conflict created by Metlife and the sliding scale
adjustment is the clearest: the First and Seventh Circuits must now
acknowledge that the dual role of an ERISA administrator is a
conflict of interest that must be taken into account when determining
an abuse of discretion.
177
The final problem created by the sliding scale adjustment affects
the two-prong test applied by the Eighth Circuit. Like the other
circuits, the best approach for the Eighth Circuit is to apply the
principles of trust law beyond those specifically written into Metlife.
The first prong of the test establishes that the claimant must prove by
"material probative evidence" the existence of a bias.' 7' This
evidentiary standard creates a considerable burden for claimants,' 79 a
burden that is unlikely to be supported by the largely pro-claimant
Metlife majority. 180  Even though the Metlife majority did not
establish specific evidentiary rules, it did indicate that it does not
"believe it necessary or desirable for [circuit] courts to create"'181 such
rules. Because of this statement by the Court, the Eighth Circuit may
chose to question its special evidentiary requirement. Insofar as
174. Id. at 2353 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal quotations
omitted).
175. Id. at 2352-53 ("The majority's approach would allow the bare existence of a conflict to enhance
the significance of other factors already considered by reviewing courts, even if the conflict is not shown
to have played any role in the denial of benefits.").
176. Id. at 2359 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959)).
177. Id. at 2350 (majority opinion).
178. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1157 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144
F.3d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir. 1998)).
179. ld.at 1158.
180. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. 2343.
181. Id. at2351.
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Metlife does not establish to what level the claimant must prove the
conflict of interest, whether actual or inherent, the Eighth Circuit will
need clarification by the Court before it can comfortably continue to
require the claimant prove bias, a requirement of proof in excess of
both an inherent or actual conflict. 182 The safest option for the Eighth
Circuit, like other circuits applying the sliding scale standard, would
be to fall back on the principles of trust law and require that the
claimant prove that the conflict "actually and improperly motivate[d]
the decision."' 83 Although this approach is easier on the claimant
than the current Eighth Circuit two-prong test, it is not as forgiving as
the Metlife majority, which allows for the consideration of both
inherent and actual conflicts.' 
84
C. The Future of the Presumptively Void Adjustment
The presumptively void adjustment will likely be invalidated soon
after the circuit courts begin applying the standard given in Metlife.
Even though Metlife establishes the conflict of interest as a factor to
be used in an abuse of discretion determination, it does not make the
conflict determinative of invalidity. 185 The majority also specifically
declines "to create special burden-of-proof rules [and] other special
procedural or evidentiary rules [that are] focused narrowly upon the
evaluator/payor conflict."' 86 These broad categories, described as
unnecessary and undesirable by the majority,' 87 include shifting the
presumptively void adjustment's burden from the claimant to the
administrator once the claimant proves an actual or an inherent
conflict. Metlife does not call for an escape route for the administrator
if it can prove that the conflict did not affect the decision.'88 Metlife
only demands that once a conflict has been established, that conflict,
whether actual or inherent, must be considered as a "factor in
182. Seeid.
183. Id. at 2357 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
184. Id. at 2352-53 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
185. Id. at 2351 (majority opinion) (stating that "conflicts are but one factor among many" to
consider).
186. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at2351.
187. Id.
188. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. 2343.
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determining whether there is an abuse of discretion."' 8 9 Metlife thus
invalidates the Tenth Circuit's burden-shifting approach.
Metlife also invalidates the Eleventh Circuit's presumption of
invalidity in cases where the administrator cannot prove that its
decision was free from influence by the conflict of interest. In the
application of the Metife holding, the circuit courts that previously
adopted the presumptively void adjustment to the Firestone standard
will return to the principles of trust law and apply the basic
"combination-of-factors" test created by Metlife.1 90
CONCLUSION
After having applied the Firestone standard to ERISA denial of
benefits claims involving a conflict of interest for the past twenty
years, the circuit courts now have a new' 91 standard to apply.
192
However, the Metlife holding, focusing generally on "instruction [of]
what a court should not do,"' 93 fails to give circuit courts any details
on what they should do while applying the Metlife standard. The
Court's "totality-of-the-circumstances"' 194 test "in which the existence
of a conflict is to be put into the mix and given some (unspecified)
'weight"" 95  is likely to make each case unique and each outcome
unpredictable. 196 ERISA claimants had hoped to achieve a heightened
189. Id. at 2350 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 115 (1989)).
190. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. 2343.
191. Notice that the majority characterizes the Metlife standard as a further application of trust law
consistent with the Firestone standard. Id. at 2350 (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115) ("We do not
believe that Firestone's statement [that a conflict should be weighed as a factor in determining abuse of
discretion] implies a change in standard of review, say, from deferential to de nova review."). In
contrast, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas view the majority standard as a
deviation away from trust law. Id. at 2354 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment); id. at 2357 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192. See generally Metlife, 128 S. Ct. 2343; Firestone, 489 U.S. 101.
193. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2358 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The opinion is rife with instruction on what a
court should not do. In the final analysis, the Court seems to advance a gestalt reasonableness standard
... by which a reviewing court, mindful of being deferential, should nonetheless consider all the
circumstances, weigh them as it thinks best, then divine whether a fiduciary's discretionary decision
should be overturned." (citation omitted)).
194. Id. at2357.
195. Id.
196. Id.; id. at 2354 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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scrutiny de novo review for their benefit denial claims. 197 But
following Metlife, claimants will flow into litigation regarding the
weight of the administrator's conflict of interest. 198 Metlife's lack of
specificity will create difficulties for courts tasked with applying its
holding, as well as potential plaintiffs deciding whether to bring a
claim and administrators defending benefit denials1 99 Despite twenty
years of requests for simplification and clarification,200 the Court in
Metlilfe has left "the law more uncertain, more unpredictable than it
found it."'20 1 Even though the ERISA law may remain in flux after
Metife, by applying the principles of trust law the circuit courts will
be able to save time, preserve judicial resources, and establish
clarification for ERISA claimants and administrators.
197. Court Stays ERISA Course, supra note 2, at 7.
198. Id ("Courts will probably wrestle with the combination-of-factors method of review set forth by
the Supreme Court for years to come. While it is unclear exactly where this will lead lower courts, the
number of lawsuits related to the importance of an administrator's conflict of interest is sure to rise
199. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2353 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200. See Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 1; Court Stays ERISA Course, supra note 2, at 6.
201. Metlife, 128 S. Ct. at 2354 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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